
McAfee Email Gateway
Security Target
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Assurance Class Assurance Components
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE: Tests
ATE_IND.1
Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Table 14 - Assurance Requirements
5.4 Rationale for TOE Security Requirements
5.4.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements
Security Objective Mapping Rationale
O.PROTECTED_COMMUNICATI
ONS
Communications protection is provided through use of encrypted
services for data transfer (FPT_ITT.1, FTP_ITC.1), and for
administrator sessions (FTP_TRP.1). These services are
supported by functions to manage encryption/decryption
(FCS_COP.1(1)), key generation and management (FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM_EXT.4, FCS_RBG_EXT.1, FPT_SKP_EXT.1), digital
signature FCS_COP.1(2), and hashing (FCS_COP.1(3),
FCS_COP.1(4)). Specific services are provided for TLS, SSH and
HTTPS (FCS_TLS_EXT.1, FCS_SSH_EXT.1,
FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1). Encryption functions can be configured by
an administrator (FMT_SMF.1).
O.VERIFIABLE_UPDATES The TOE provides functionality to generate hash values
(FMT_SMF.1, FCS_COP.1(3)) that can be used only by an
administrator to check the validity of updates (FPT_TUD_EXT.1).
O.SYSTEM_MONITORING The TOE generates audit records (FAU_GEN.1) that are
attributable to users (FAU_GEN.2). Audit records may be exported
for storage (FAU_STG_EXT.1).
O.DISPLAY_BANNER The TOE generates a warning banner following login
(FTA_TAB.1).
O.TOE_ADMINISTRATION The TOE controls login (FIA_UIA_EXT.1) using passwords
(FIA_PMG_EXT.1) that are not stored in clear
(FPT_APW_EXT.1). Entered passwords are not displayed on
screen (FIA_UAU.7). Protection is provided through session
suspension or expiry (FTA_SSL_EXT.1, FTA_SSL.3), and
protection of communication paths against modification or
disclosure (FTP_TRP.1). A number of security management roles
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