McAfee HARDWARE 1.4 Przewodnik Instalacji Pobierz pdf (Strona 55)

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FCS_SSH_EXT.1 SSH

The administrator can configure the TOE to permit SSH client to be used for export of audit data.

FPT_TST_EXT.1 TSF Testing

MEG self-tests are run during startup to ensure that the TOE is functioning properly to demonstrate

correct operation of the TSF. At power-on the hardware will perform standard BIOS tests. This includes a

check for the presence of memory. The TOE appliances make use of ECC RAM, and should there be an

uncorrectable error the appliance will not boot. The TOE uses an Error Detection Code (EDC) for integrity

over the firmware.

MEG performs a crypto module integrity check using HMAC-SHA-256, and it runs all approved algorithm

cryptographic self-tests.

The BIOS performs power on self tests applicable to the hardware. The BIOS then boots the appliance

OS, and verifies all of the files that form the software (using SHA-256). It verifies that the cryptographic

engines used can function in FIPS mode, that the appliance configuration is compatible with FIPS mode,

and that the configuration originated from a FIPS mode device.

FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection

Packets are processed within the Linux TCP socket send queue in a manner that ensures all residual

data in the socket buffer is overwritten before the packet is sent. All drivers that do not explicitly clear

frame data before use, or which may DMA or transfer data beyond the buffer end onto the wire, will call

skb_pad to perform the requisite clearing of data. This function checks the buffer for trailing bytes, and

where these exist they are overwritten with zeros. If the buffer already contains sufficient data to fill the

frame it is untouched; otherwise it is extended.

6.1.2 Identification & Authentication

Access to the MEG appliance is gained through a network connection of an administrator management

computer to the appliance and utilizes a browser based interface to gain access to the appliance

management GUI. The User Interface for this purpose is provided by an Apache Web Server running

within the MEG Operating System environment. The computer used for this purpose can be a general

purpose machine running Microsoft Internet Explorer 7.0, 8.0 or 9.0, or Firefox 3.0, 3.5 or 4.0 with TLS v1

encryption, with ActiveX enabled.

FIA_UID_EXT.1, FIA_UAU_EXT.2, FIA_UAU.7, FPT_APW_EXT.1 - Identification and Authentication

Administrators gain access to the TOE appliance by opening a secure browser session using HTTPS on

the Administrator Management Computer. The MEG Operating System performs the Administrator

authentication process. Upon entering the IP address of the TOE appliance, the administrator receives a

logon dialog presented by the Apache web server component. The Administrator enters the applicable

username and password, the password is hashed and compared with hashed password values within the

TOE appliance database resource within the underlying operating system. The entered password is not

displayed on the screen. If the hashed values match, then the Administrator is authenticated.

Communication between the Administrator Management Computer and TOE Appliance is secured via

TLS.

If the password has expired (after the configured number of days) the administrator is required to select

and enter a new password, confirming the choice through re-entry of the old password.

Passwords for authentication are not stored in plaintext, are obfuscated, and protected by restricted file

permissions.

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